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THE BEGINNINGS OF COAL SUBSTITUTION

A. Foreword
In the wake of the oil embargo of 1973-1974, Congress recognized
the need to redirect the nation's energy reliance to coal as a substitute for imported petroleum and scarce natural gas. By that time,
however, efforts to mandate coal substitution had to surmount formidable legal, economic and technical obstacles that favored continued reliance on oil and natural gas. In these circumstances, Con* University of Vermont; A.B., Hofstra University (1963); J.D., Columbia University
(1966); Director, Office of Industrial Programs, Strategic Petroleum Reserve, Washington,
D.C. Mr. Rosenblum, as the former Chief, Legal & Regulatory Branch, Office of Fuel Utilization, Federal Energy Administration, was responsible for initially implementing the ESECA
program and issuing prohibition and construction orders under the Act.
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gress established a pilot program that could, by definition, achieve
only limited coal substitution; it intended that the program would
help to determine the scope of future coal substitution efforts.
This article concentrates on the coal substitution program that
was created by the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination
Act of 1974 (ESECA). That Act, which attempts to reconcile energy
needs and environmental protection, authorizes the Federal Energy
Administration (FEA) to order powerplants and "major fuel burning installations" to substitute coal for oil or gas as their boiler fuel.
This article describes the complex resolution of public policies that
led to ESECA and identifies the major actions taken by FEA to
implement the Act.
In the eighteen months that FEA has worked with the ESECA
legislation, it has found that, while efforts to increase coal use are
constrained by technical and economic problems, legal policies-in
the form of direct regulation, disincentives and uncertainties about
the scope and cost of future regulation-have played a primary role
in reducing the nation's capacity for short-term, large-scale coal
substitution. As part of the assessment of the potential for coal
substitution, this survey identifies the legal constraints to greater
coal use, the impact of germane legislation, and the public policy
issues that require resolution if coal is to replace imported oil or
natural gas in significant amounts.
The subject is of more than passing interest, for Congress recently
extended ESECA until 1985,2 thereby assuring that FEA's coal substitution program will continue and will affect an increasing number
of facilities. During the current legislative session, Congress is also
considering legislation to amend the Clean Air Act of 1970 ' and to
create a large-scale coal substitution program.'
Because of the long leadtimes that will be necessary to develop
synthetic fuels from coal, and the difficulties inherent in expanding
coal to entirely new markets, coal substitution in the utility and
industrial sectors appears to be the most viable option for increasing
the use of our most abundant fossil fuel resource. It is hoped that
this article will serve as a research tool for further investigation of
1. Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 791-98 (Supp. IV, 1974), as
amended (Supp. V, 1975) and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 101, 89 Stat. 875 (1975).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
4. See notes 200-72 and text accompanying infra.
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this developing area of energy law and focus attention both on the
fuel substitution program that is being implemented by FEA and
on the legislation that is presently being considered in Congress.
B.

The Drift to Oil

As early as 1961, Senator Randolph of West Virginia called attention to this nation's increasing dependence on foreign oil and
warned his colleagues:
[It is a small source of comfort and security to Americans
• . . that what might become an anti-American land has in her
earth unlimited quantities of the same kind of energy fuels that
are the very lifeblood of America. What guarantees do we
Americans have that the African continent, or Venezuela, or
Kuwait or any of the other prolific oil areas of the world will
constantly make their riches available to us? . . . Every year
that passes, in which we become more and more dependent on
foreign oil to buttress our national economy and security perhaps, is 1 year nearer disaster.5
Through 1950, the United States was self-sufficient in energy and,
although demand was growing, needs were being met by domestic
coal, oil, gas and hydropower. 6 Thereafter, while demand for energy
grew at an accelerating rate7 and more than doubled from 1950 to
1970,8 exploitation of domestic sources slowed.' By 1959, exploration
for new domestic oil had peaked, and the United States was importing 19 percent of the petroleum it consumed. I0 By 1971, coal furnished only 18 percent of total American energy consumption, while
5. Hearingson National Fuels Study Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 13 (1961).
6. FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, PROJECT INDEPENDENCE: A SUMMARY 17 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as PIAS].
7. FORD FOUNDATION, A TIME TO CHOOSE 5-20 (1974) [hereinafter cited as A TIME TO
CHOOSE]; PIAS, supra note 6, at 17.
8. American energy consumption increased from approximately 33 quadrillion Btu's per
year in 1950 to approximately 68 quadrillion Btu's in 1970. FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION,
PROJECT INDEPENDENCE REPORT 7 (1974) [hereinafter cited as PIRI. The energy policy project
of the Ford Foundation confirmed this view of expanding demand, and estimated 1973 American energy use at 75 quadrillion Btu's. A TIME TO CHOOSE, supra note 7, at 5. The Senate
Finance Committee report, converting all United States energy use into the equivalent of
barrels of oil, indicates that energy consumption increased from 11.00 million barrels of oil
per day in 1930 to 11.80 in 1940, 16.62 in 1950, 21.06 in 1960, 31.69 in 1970, and 35.28 in 1973.
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 94TH CONG., IST SESS., ENERGY STATISTICS 16 (1975).
9. PIR, supra note 8, at 75-76; PIAS, supra note 6, at 17.
10. PIR, supra note 8, at 76.
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petroleum furnished 44 percent;" to meet these needs, oil imports
had risen to 26 percent of the amount of oil used. 2 By 1973, dependence on foreign sources had increased to 35 percent of petroleum
consumed.' 3
During this period, while the absolute tonnages of coal being consumed increased, coal's share of the rapidly growing energy market
declined. Although there had been major shifts in coal use patterns
since 1935, a consistent trend toward greater demand had been
apparent since the late 1960's," and domestic coal consumption of
551.3 million tons in 1974 nearly equalled the peak consumption of
coal in 1946.'1 However, while overall energy demand more than
doubled from 1950 to 1970, annual domestic consumption of coal
increased by only about 60 percent and actually declined in some
sectors.'"
In the post-World War II period, coal's decline was largely attributable to the loss of three of its largest markets-the railroads,' 7
home heating'" and the chemical industry' 9-which converted al11.

SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, ELECTRIC UTILITY POLICY ISSUES, S.

Doc. No. 45, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1974). This trend continued until the embargo. Overall
1973 energy consumption was furnished by oil (46%), natural gas (31%), coal (18%), hydropower (4') and nuclear generation (1%). A TIME TO CHOOSE, supra note 7, at 5.
12. PIR, supra note 8, at 76; PIAS, supra note 6, at 17.
13. PIAS, supra note 6, at 17.
14.
SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, FACTORS AFFECTING COAL SUasTrrUTION FOR OTHER FUELS IN ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION AND INDUSTRIAL USES, S. Doc. No. 17,

94th Cong., lst Sess. 21 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FACS]. According to the report, domestic coal consumption has risen from 430.9 million tons in 1940 to 454.2 million tons in 1950,
380.4 million tons in 1960, 459.1 million tons in 1965 and 517.1 million tons in 1970.
15. Id. According to the report, more coal was consumed in 1945 (559.5 million tons) than
1973 (556 million tons).
16. Id.
17.

SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, FACTORS AFFECTING THE USE OF COAL

ENERGY MARKETS, S. Doc. No. 9, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973)
thereinafter cited as FAJ]. Because of increasing dieselization, between 1945 and 1950,
railroads reduced their use of coal by 50% (from 125 to 61 million tons); by 1960, railroad use
was down to two million tons. "In terms of total consumption, the railroads, which represented almost 25 percent of the total consumption of 560 million tons in 1945, dropped to
about 12 percent of total consumption in 1950, to 4 percent in the late 1950's, and to less than
one percent in the early 1960's." Id.
18. Id. at 4. Introduction of the welded pipeline, and the convenience and cleanliness of
oil and gas for space heating, caused home heating use of coal to decline from 119 million
tons in 1945 (21 percent of total domestic coal consumption) to 11 million tons in 1971
(slightly more than 2 percent of total consumption).
19. FACS, supra note 14, at 21. Since 1945, the chemical industry has switched almost
entirely from coal-based raw materials (acetylene) to gas and oil-based raw materials (ethylene).
IN PRESENT AND FUTURE
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most entirely to other fuels. Since 1945, with the exception of continued steel industry demand for high quality metallurgical coke, "
coal has become a "one market" product aimed at electric utilities. 2'
The postwar "energy explosion" has imposed enormous demands on
the electric generating industry which, since 1947, has increased
consumption of energy from all sources by more than 400 percent.
From 1945 to 1974, the utilities met this demand by burning increasing amounts of oil (which rose from 4 percent of utility base fuel in
1945 to 18 percent in 1974), natural gas (from zero to 17 percent)
and nuclear energy (from zero to 6 percent).22 The utilities also
increased their consumption of coal from 72 million tons in 1945 (13
percent of total domestic coal consumption) to 391 million tons in
1974 (70 percent); however, coal's share of the utility market declined from 52 to 44 percent. Coal's position in the utility sector
deteriorated in the late 1960's, as fewer new fossil fuel fired powerplants were built to burn coal, 4 and increasing numbers of existing
coal fired plants were converted to oil."5 A report prepared for the
Senate Interior Committee concluded that this decline in coal
growth was most pronounced on a regional basis, particularly on the
East Coast, and that this was largely due to state and local air
quality control standards.
20. Id. at 22. High quality metallurgical or coking coals, which are used in steel making,
are low in sulfur content and premium priced; in consequence, coking coal is not generally
competitive in the steam coal market. See also FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, PROJECT
INDEPENDENCE BLUEPRINT, FINAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON COAL 13, 41 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as PIBI, which indicates that approximately one-third of United States coking coal production is exported for steelmaking overseas.
21. FACS, supra note 14, at 21.
22. Id. at 22, 23.
23. Id.
24. The Congressional Research Service noted in 1973 that "increasingly, much of the new
generating capacity in the last 20 years has turned to oil or gas, rather than coal, for fuel
because of price competitiveness (including regulated price of interstate gas) and most recently air pollution control (primarily sulfur) requirements." FAU, supra note 17, at 4. According to FEA,.by 1970 "only 40 percent of new boiler orders provided for coal firing capability. However, in response to the increased price of oil and natural gas shortages, by 1974, 97
percent of new boiler orders provided for coal firing capacity." 121 CONG. REC. 7421 (daily
ed. May 5, 1975).
25. Between 1965 and 1973, 398 utility boilers with a total nameplate capacity of 28,785
megawatts converted from coal to oil. FACS, supra note 14, at 24-25.
26. Id. In 1973, while oil provided 94 percent of the total energy input to fossil fuel fired
powerplants in New England, coal provided 93 percent of total utility energy input in the East
North Central (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin) and East South Central
(Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi and Tennessee) regions. The Congressional Research Service reports that while in 1965 coal supplied 70 percent of the fuel for 100 coal burning power

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 14: 581

During this period, other legal, economic and policy decisions
eroded coal's position in the utility market. A Supreme Court decision in 1954 that upheld the Federal Power Commission's authority
to regulate prices in interstate markets, 2 and economic conditions
that favored exploration and development," combined to allow
cheap regulated natural gas to provide strong competition for coal. 9
Since 1950, the natural gas share of the growing utility market increased from 13 to 17 percent; since 1953, utilities increased their
boiler fuel use of natural gas by almost 400 percent. 0 In 1966, largely
because of demand fostered by New York City's stringent new clean
air requirements,' the import quota on residual oil was lifted in
Petroleum Administration District (PAD) I (East Coast). As a consequence, residual oil imports rose from 27 million barrels in 1964
to 555 million barrels in 1971. After 1966, it actually became cheaper
for New England plants to import low-priced residual oil than to
buy and transport coal from the nearby Appalachian fields."2 For
this reason, the Penn Central Railroad's East Coast coal traffic
dropped dramatically, by some 33 million tons.3
The trend away from utility coal use was reinforced by the beginnings of environmental regulation in the mid-1960's, particularly in
the Northeastern cities.3 In the West, the construction of generating
plants was banned in Los Angeles, which entered into long-term
contracts for electricity generated from coal in the Four Corners area
(New Mexico, Colorado, Arizona and Nevada) at considerable
added costs and with energy losses from long range transmission. 5
plants in the New England, Middle Atlantic and South Atlantic rcgions, by 1972, coal was
supplying only 19 percent of the fuel to 27 coal burning plants in this area. Id. The report
states that this East Coast fuel switching "is attributed primarily to the necessity for complying with air pollution control requirements." Id. at 4.
27. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
28. PIR, supra note 8, at 86.
29. FACS, supra note 14, at 22-23.
30. Id. at 27. However, in December 1974, natural gas supplied only 12.5 percent of the
energy input for utilities, while coal supplied 45 percent, oil supplied 19 percent, hydropower
supplied 15 percent and nuclear reactors supplied 8 percent.
31. See FACS, supra note 14, at 24.
32. Id. at 5, 11, 24.
33. FAU, supra note 17, at 11.
34. FACS, supra note 14, at 24. Starting in 1964, New York and other Northeastern cities
established sulfur limits which forced the use of low sulfur fuels for burning. After the residual
oil import quota was lifted in 1966, low sulfur coal could not compete economically with
imported residual oil. FAU, supra note 17, at 11.
35. Hearings on Problems of Electrical Power Production in the Southwest Before the
Senate Comm. on Interior and InsularAffairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 16, pt. 7, at 7 (1971)
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Other state and local regulations were enacted during this period to
require reduction of visible smoke plumes and sulfur and particulate
emissions; this, too, favored the use of cleaner natural gas and oil
over coal." The Federal Clean Air Act amendments of 1970,"' which
established ambitious schedules to reduce emission of coal related
pollutants, also expedited fuel switching. In response to the increasing costs of pollution control, utility conversions from coal to oil rose
dramatically from 9 conversions in 1965 to 63 in 1970, 87 in 1971,
and 85 in 1972.38 The Congressional Research Service specifically
attributed these fuel conversions to "the requirement for meeting
Federal and State air quality standards." 9
This drift to increased dependence on imported oil caused little
alarm. An oil embargo imposed by the Arab states after the Six-Day
War of 1967 had no impact on relatively energy-independent America, although it did cause hardship, rationing and price increases in
import-dependent Western Europe." By the early 1970's, however,
some energy planners began to share Senator Randolph's concern
about the effects of increasing dependence on imported oil. In May
1971, the Senate authorized the members of three committees to
make a full and complete investigation and study of national fuels
and energy policies. 4' In 1972, the Office of Emergency Preparedness
expressed concern that increased reliance on foreign petroleum
could affect national security and the balance of payments;4 2 later
that year, regional shortages of natural gas drew some attention to
the need for energy planning.4 3 In January 1973, the Federal Power
Commission inventoried 725 fossil fuel fired powerplants to identify
facilities that could convert to coal if oil supplies proved inade(submission of New Mexico Citizens for Clean Air and Water). See also Christian Science
Monitor, Jan. 27, 1971, at 178, col. 1.
36. FACS, supra note 14, at 12.
37. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975)). As shown more fully below, the 1970
amendments provided, inter alia, for promulgation and achievement of national primary
ambient air quality standards for certain pollutants as expeditiously as practicable.
38. FACS, supra note 14, at 25.
39. FAU, supra note 17, at 68.
40. PIAS, supra note 6, at 12.
41. S. Res. 45, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 13227 (1971). These committees,
which exist today, played a very active role in the passage of ESECA, and prepared the
hearings, the background material and the proposed legislation for S. 1777, discussed infra.
42. FACS, supra note 14, at 24. See also U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Office of Emergency
Preparedness, The Potential for Energy Conservation: Substitution for Scarce Fuels (1973).
43. PIR, supra note 8, at 86.
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quate. 4 By April, some oil companies were refusing to accept new
customers. Congress then passed the Economic Stabilization Act
Amendments of 1973, 41which authorized the President to order allocations of gasoline to assure that essential needs were met at equitable prices. On April 18, 1973, in his "Energy Message to Congress,"
President Nixon recognized that increased petroleum imports were
making the nation "dependent" on others and warned, "If present
trends continue unchecked, we could face a genuine energy crisis."4
As part of a "comprehensive program . . . to minimize risks to
national security of supply interruptions," he urged that "highest
national priority" be given to developing coal, that industry voluntarily choose to use coal instead of oil,47 and that there be some
relaxation of Clean Air Act standards.4" The President additionally
urged the states to ensure utilities a "rapid and fair return on pollution control equipment," and Congress to pass legislation defining
the environmental parameters of surface mining.49
The oil embargo, imposed on the United States beginning on
October 17, 1973, deprived the nation, by January 1974, of 2.7 million barrels of oil per day and reduced petroleum supplies to 14
percent below expected consumption. During the embargo, oil
prices jumped from three dollars per barrel in September 1973 to
more than eleven dollars per barrel in January 1974. Although massive social and economic disruptions were avoided, FEA estimates
that the embargo, which was lifted in March 1974, and the accompanying oil price hikes reduced the United States Gross National
Product by $10 to $20 billion, caused unemployment for 500,000
44. Federal Power Commission, The Potential for Conversion of Oil-Fired and Gas-Fired
Electric Generating Units to Coal (1973).
45. Pub. L. No. 93-28, 87 Stat. 27, amending Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-379, §§ 201-06, 84 Stat. 799 (set out in note under 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (Supp. V, 1975)).
46. BNA ENERGY USERS REP. REFERENCE FILE 21:0101.
47. Id. The President did not seek mandatory coal substitution authority nor did he ask
Congress to act. Instead, he urged only voluntary action: "Present and potential users who
are able to choose among energy sources should consider the national interest as they make
their choice. Each decision against coal increases petroleum or gas consumption, compromising our national self-sufficiency and raising the cost of meeting our energy needs." Id.
48. Id. at 21:0104. In order to encourage coal use, the President suggested that the Clean
Air Act be implemented "in a judicious manner, carefully meeting the primary, healthrelated standards, but not moving in a precipitous way toward meeting the secondary standards." Id.
49. Id. The President urged passage of such legislation with dispatch because "[u]ntil
the coal industry knows the mining rules under which it will have to operate . . .underutilization of . . . coal will be the result."
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workers, and was responsible for one-third of the 9.8 percent increase in consumer prices. ' "
C.

Response to the Embargo

In the context of increasing energy concern, the embargo elicited
a prompt response from the executive and legislative branches,
which began to act before the oil supply interruption impacted on
the United States. On November 8, 1973, the President delivered an
"Emergency Energy Message" to Congress, in which he urged
prompt passage of an "emergency energy bill" that would, inter
alia, authorize him to order coal substitution for powerplants and
major installations,"' and allow the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to relax federal and state air and water quality laws
and regulations.5 2 The President also promised that the executive
branch would take immediate administrative action so that coal
burning plants "will be prevented from converting to oil," and that
"[e]fforts will also be made to convert powerplants from the use
of oil to the use of coal. 5 3 On November 13, Congress passed the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act," which expedited pipeline construction by declaring adequate the pertinent environmental impact statement, which was then being disputed in the courts.
The following day, Congress passed the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act55 which was implemented by the Energy Policy Office
and its successors, the Federal Energy Office and FEA.56 During this
period, Congress was considering coal substitution provisions as
part of the larger "emergency energy bill" that had been requested
by the President.
50. PIAS, supra note 6, at 18. For an excellent analysis of the widespread social and
economic impacts of the embargo, see PIR, supra note 8, at 283-304.
51. SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, EXEcUTIVE ENERGY MESSAGES, S. Doc.
No. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 95, 97 (1975) [hereinafter cited as EXECUTIVE ENERGY
MESSAGES]. The President asked for authority, "where practicable, to order a power plant or
other installation to convert from the use of a fuel such as oil to . . .coal and to make such
equipment conversions as are necessary." Id. at 97.
52. Id. The President requested that the "emergency energy bill" contain provisions authorizing the EPA to grant "exemption or ... waivers of stationary sources from federal and
state air and water quality laws and regulations." Id.
53. Id. at 95.
54. Pub. L. No. 93-153, §§ 201-06, 87 Stat. 584 (1973) (now codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 165155 (Supp. V, 1975)).
55. Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (1973) (now codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-56 (Supp.
V, 1975)).
56. Exec. Order No. 11,748, 3 C.F.R. 376 (1974).
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On November 27, 1973, the Energy Policy Office took the administrative action promised in the President's "Emergency Energy
7 which prohibited powerMessage," by issuing EPO regulation 2,1
plants and large industrial installations from converting from high
to low sulfur fuels. It provided that "[n]o petroleum products shall
be sold . . to or accepted by any person for burning under power
generators that were not using petroleum products" on December
7, 1973.58 On January 23, 1974, President Nixon delivered his State
of the Union Address, in which he urged passage of an omnibus
energy bill containing provisions for fuel conversion and amendments to the Clean Air Act. He also urged creation of a "Federal
Energy Administration" to organize the federal government's
''many energy programs . . . in the best possible manner," and to
direct the government's efforts under "Project Independence." 59
By this time, the "voluntary program" of coal substitution was
beginning to register modest gains. In response to requests from the
President and from Federal Energy Office Administrator William
Simon, 14 boilers at 9 utility generating stations had voluntarily
reconverted from oil to coal by mid-January 1974.60 By March 1 of
that year, a total of 22 boilers at 11 East Coast generating stations
had voluntarily converted, substituting approximately 13,000 tons
of coal per day for 53,000 barrels of oil."I After the oil embargo ended
in late March 1974, however, environmental pressures for reconversion made themselves felt. In early April 1974, Congress learned
that, because the air quality variances would expire on May 15, all
of the converted facilities would have to reconvert to oil.2 In midApril, for example, Connecticut ordered Northeast Utilities to reconvert to oil when it had consumed its coal, 3 and other environmental authorities also ordered "voluntary" plants to reconvert."' In
57. 38 Fed. Reg. 32577 (1973).
58. Id. EPO Reg. 2, which has been adopted by the FEA, 10 C.F.R. pt. 215 (1976), will
be discussed further infra.
59. State of the Union Address by President Nixon, Jan. 23, 1974, quoted in BNA ENERGY
USERS REP. REFERENCE FILE

21:0462-66.

60. FACS, supra note 14, at 25. See also 120 CONG. REC. 8020 (daily ed. May 14, 1974)
(remarks of Senator Randolph).
61. FACS, supra note 14, at 25.
62. On April 10, 1974, former Administrator William Simon so informed the House Government Operations Committee. 120 CONG. REC. 8020 (daily ed. May 14, 1974)(remarks of
Senator Randolph).
63. FACS, supra note 14, at 26.
64. On May 14, 1974, Senator Randolph reported the case of a Massachusetts utility that
had secured "waivers" from the state and purchased 500,000 tons of coal, only to be told, by
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May, Senator Randolph warned that the conversion program was
jeopardized and added that while the utilities and the domestic coal
industry had responded to the national energy crisis, "now that the
crisis is over we are returning to oil ways-imported oil."6' 5 Although
oil prices had tripled since the embargo began, by July, under pressure of environmental regulation, 7 of the 11 generating stations that
had converted to coal as part of the "voluntary program" had reconverted to oil."
II.

THE ENERGY SUPPLY AND ENVIRONMENTAL COORDINATION ACT OF

1974
A.

Background

On October 18, 1973, Senators Jackson, Randolph and Magnuson
introduced S. 2589,17 which, inter alia, authorized the President to
(1) order powerplants to convert from oil or gas to coal, and (2) grant
"temporary variances" from air quality standards. The coal substitution provisions authorized the President, "in time of actual or
impending emergency fuel shortage" to "require that . . .powerplants which now burn petroleum or natural gas and which have the
capability to reconvert to coal shall convert the necessary plant
equipment and revert to burning coal as their primary energy
source."" In addition, this bill, reflecting the need for dispatch,
authorized the President to grant "temporary variances from air
the federal EPA, that "the reconversion could not move forward, even for a temporary period
of time." 120 CONG. REC. 8017 (daily ed. May 14, 1974). On May 1, Congresswoman Abzug
noted with approval, "The New York City Environmental Protection Administration revoked
a short-term variance to Consolidated Edison to burn coal and high sulphur oil once it
realized that the shortage of oil conforming to State and local pollution control standards was
far less than expected and this is so all over the country." 120 CONG. REC. 3436 (daily ed.
May 1, 1974).
65. 120 CONG. REc. 8020 (daily ed. May 14, 1974). The Senator also read into the record
a letter of April 24 from Carl Bagge, president of the National Coal Association, to President
Nixon, asserting that elimination of the "voluntary program" would "constitute a serious
breach of faith with the coal industry. At the request of [government officials] . . .earlier
this year, major coal producers agreed to invest in equipment needed to expand production
so that the fuel requirements of the converted powerplants could be met. Yet now they face
the prospect of having the coal but not the markets." Id.
66. FACS, supra note 14, at 26.
67. S. 2589, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (National Emergency Petroleum Act of 1973),
reprinted in Hearingson Energy Emergency Legislation Before the Senate Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 22, pt. 1, at 3-14 (1973) thereinafter cited as
Energy Emergency Legislation Hearings].
68. Energy Emergency Legislation Hearings, supra note 67, at 9.
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quality emissions standards . . . for the duration of the fuel shortage only . . . if the only available coal, when burned, will exceed
air quality standards." 9 On November 8, the Senate revised S. 2589
to tighten the conditions under which environmental variances
could be granted. The revised bill authorized EPA-rather than the
President-to grant variances to converting plants, and allowed
EPA to do so only upon receipt of a detailed application from a
plant explaining why the variance was needed and a commitment
from the plant to employ "control systems" to meet environmental
standards, and only after holding a public hearing. Further, the
revised bill forbade the granting of a variance where coal-related
emissions "would result in violation of any national primary ambient air quality standard or would have any adverse impact on
public health, safety or well-being." Finally, the revised bill limited
the effective period of any variance to six months.7' These revised
coal substitution provisions 7 and Clean Air Act amendments72 were
contained in S. 2589 when it was passed by the Senate on November
19." After complex maneuvering related to the petroleum pricing
portions of the bill, Congress, on February 27, 1974, passed S. 2589
as the Energy Emergency Act." On March 6, President Nixon vetoed the bill, primarily because of its domestic oil price rollback
provisions; he did not object to the bill's coal substitution provisions. The Senate sustained the veto the same day.7"
On March 28, 1974, Congressman Staggers, Chairman of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, introduced
another omnibus energy bill,7" which contained coal substitution"
69. Id.
70. Id. at 21-25.
71. 119 CONG. REC. 37626 (1973).
72. Id. at 37629-30.
73. Id. at 37624.
74. 120 CoNG. REC. 1242-43 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1974).
75. 120 CONG. Ric. 2883-84, 2900, 2907-26 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1974).
76. H.R. 13834, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Standby Energy Emergency Authorities Act),
reprinted in Hearings on Standby Energy Emergency Authorities Act Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 70, at 3-96 (1974)
Ihereinafter cited as Standby Energy Emergency Authorities Act Hearings].
77. Standby Energy Emergency Authorities Act Hearings,supra note 76, at 17-19. Section
105(a) authorized the soon-to-be created FEA to prohibit "major fuel burning installations"
and powerplants from burning natural gas or petroleum as their "primary energy source"
to the extent practicable and consistent with the objectives of this Act . . . after
balancing on a plant-by-plant basis the environmental effects of use of coal against
the need to fulfill the purposes of this Act . . . [if the plant] on the date of enactment
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and allocation provisions," and which would have amended the
Clean Air Act in a manner similar to that proposed in the vetoed
S. 2589. 71 On April 3, Administrator William Simon of the Federal
Energy Office advised the Staggers Committee that because conditions had eased, an omnibus energy bill was no longer required;
instead, he urged that Congress give prompt attention to a number
of individual legislative proposals, including the coal substitution
provisions of the earlier bills."0
In order to expedite passage of the coal substitution provisions,
the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, on April
26, reported H.R. 14368, which split the coal substitution and clean
air provisions from the more controversial provisions of the omnibus
bill. " ' The House passed this bill on May 1.82 On May 14, Senator
Muskie introduced as an amendment to H.R. 14368 a new Senate
version of the bill.13 As amended, H.R. 14368 limited coal substitution by narrowing the scope of the Clean Air Act extensions that
would be available. The bill sought to achieve an "environmental
protection" purpose by (1) adding highly protective "regional limitation" provisions, (2) making implementation plan revisions
of this Act, has the capability and necessary plant equipment to burn coal . . . . A
prohibition on use of natural gas and petroleum products under this subsection shall
be contingent upon the availability of coal, coal transportation facilities, and the
maintenance of reliability of service in a given service area.
Section 105(a) also required FEA to order that fossil fuel fired powerplants in the "early
planning process" be designed to burn coal.
78. Id. at 65-72.
79. The new amendments to the Clean Air Act, which represented a quantum leap in
complexity, would have made the granting of clean air extensions a more lengthy, involved
and uncertain process, and would have required greater commitments from plants seeking
an extension to burn coal. Section 201 foreshadowed section 3 of ESECA by allowing EPA to
suspend federal, state and local air pollution requirements until January 1, 1979, for facilities
receiving FEA orders; by requiring public hearings and "high commitment" compliance
schedules; by exempting facilities with FEA orders from new source performance standards;
by making special provisions for "early phaseout" powerplants; and by allowing EPA to make
"fuel exchange designations." In addition, section 201 would have allowed state and local
authorities, as well as EPA to (1) prohibit coal use "likely to materially contribute to a
significant risk to public health" and (2) require use of available coal with specific pollution
characteristics. Section 202 foreshadowed section 4 of ESECA, but went further, by allowing
EPA to require that a state revise its implementation plan for air quality control regions in
which coal conversion had taken place. Section 205(c) prescribed NEPA requirements for coal
conversion orders similar to those in section 7(c) of ESECA. Id. at 65-82, 85-87.
80. Standby Energy Emergency Authorities Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 132.
81. H.R. 14368, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), 120 CONG. REc. 3345 (daily ed. April 29, 1974).
82. 120 CONG. REc. 3462 (daily ed. May 1, 1974).
83. 120 CONG. REc. 8012 (daily ed. May 14, 1974).
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(aimed at fostering coal burning) voluntary on the part of the states
instead of mandatory, and (3) providing that FEA's authority to
order coal substitution would expire on June 30, 1975.84 Senator
Muskie noted that the new bill, which was introduced almost two
months after the end of the embargo, was not crisis-related; he
predicted that, in view of the provisions inserted to protect the
environment, near-term coal substitutions "may be as few as a
dozen, but these conversions can and will take pressure off the oil
market without endangering public health."85 No opposition was
voiced to Senator Muskie's bill and the Senate passed it the day it
was introduced. 6 At the House-Senate conference, the Senate's
more restrictive version generally prevailed; following enactment,
the bill, entitled "The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974" (ESECA), was signed into law by the President
on June 22, 1974.11
B.

Summary of Provisions

ESECA established a mandatory federal coal substitution program. As will be shown below, the Act authorized FEA to: (1) order
certain existing powerplants and "major fuel burning installations"
to convert from oil or gas to coal for steam generation; (2) order
powerplants in the "early planning process" to build in coal-burning
capability; and (3) allocate coal. In addition, the Act (4) mandated
procedures that have the effect of preventing or delaying coal substitution in many cases. In order to provide an overview of the coal
substitution program as it is being implemented, and to avoid repetition, the following summary combines three levels of analysis.
84. Id. at 8009-12.
85. Id. at 8013. The changed focus of the amendments was indicated by Senator Muskie,
who stated: "We are not, under the threat of crisis, abandoning our environmental goals, but
we are trying to propose a mechanism which will balance those environmental goals with what
we perceive to be the long-term energy needs of the country." Id. at 8012-13. The Senator
restated his steadfast adherence to environmental goals by noting that "the enactment of
limited amendments to the Clean Air Act at this time will be of value" and he stated that
the Senate bill created a "limited program" which "can and will be initiated while the
Congress continues to review the Clean Air Act and examines the need for broader authority
to reduce dependency on foreign fuels." Id.
86. Id. at 8032.
87. Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 791-98 (Supp. IV, 1974), as
amended (Supp. V, 1975) and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) The President took the
opportunity to state that while the bill represented a step in the right direction, the limited
conversion authorities fell short of what was needed and that additional Clean Air Act amendments would be required. ExEcuTivE ENERGY MESSAGES, supra note 51, at 153.
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Each of the major provisions is discussed as it appeared in the Act,
as elucidated in the legislative history (where necessary), and as
reflected in FEA's regulations.
1(a).

Conversion of Existing Plants

ESECA authorizes FEA to prohibit existing powerplants" or
"major fuel burning installations"" from burning petroleum products or natural gas as their "primary energy source" 90 in individual
boilers." FEA may issue "prohibition orders" having this effect only
if it can make four required findings. First, FEA must find that the
plant or installation had the "capability and necessary plant equipment to burn coal" as of June 22, 1974, the date of enactment of
ESECA12 While this criterion confines ESECA to reconversion of
existing plants, it does not restrict the statute's application to
plants that had 100 percent "push-button" coal burning capability
on the date of enactment. The conferees made it clear that "capability" is not an absolute standard, and that the absence, on the relevant date, of any one or a number of the items of equipment that
are necessary to burn coal is not grounds for exemption."
88. A "powerplant" is defined in the Act to mean "a fossil-fuel fired electric generating
unit which produces electric power for purposes of sale or exchange." ESECA § 2(e)(1), 15
U.S.C. § 792(e)(1) (Supp. V, 1975).
89. While this term was used in the Act, Congress left it undefined. FEA's regulations
define "major fuel burning installation" (MFBI) as "an installation or unit other than a
powerplant that has or is a fossil-fuel fired boiler, burner, or other combuster of fuel . . . at
a single site ....
" 10 C.F.R. § 305.2 (1976). The FEA set a higher threshold in its regulations, id. § 305.4(b)(1), by providing that prohibition orders would be issued only to MFBI's
"
that have "a design firing rate of 100 million Btu's per hours [sic] or greater ....
90. While Congress used this term but did not define it in the Act, FEA defined "primary
energy source" in its regulations as
the fuel that is or will be used for all purposes except for the minimum amounts
required for startup, testing, flame stabilization and control; and except for such
minimum amounts required to enable [the source] . . . to comply with applicable
primary standard conditions prescribed by EPA . ...
10 C.F.R. § 305.2 (1976). In the preamble to its regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 20462 (1975), FEA
explained the reasons for this approach: "The purpose of ESECA is to encourage the burning
of coal to the greatest extent practicable, and it would be inconsistent with this purpose to
permit more than the minimum uses of petroleum products and natural gas specified in the
regulations."
91. ESECA § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 792(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
92. Id.
93. The conference report, after listing equipment necessary to burn coal, stated:
It is not intended, however, to imply that the absence of any one or combination of
these facilities or equipment would be grounds for concluding that the facility lacked
capability or necessary plant equipment to burn coal. Nor is it intended that this
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Second, ESECA requires that FEA find that "coal . . . will be
available during the period the order is in effect,""4 which period
5
could, under the recent amendments, be until December 31, 1984.
Because coal is relatively "boiler specific," 9 FEA interprets this
criterion to require a finding that coal will be available whose specifications-including ash fusion temperature and heat contentmake it appropriate for burning under the boiler in question. 7 In
addition, because ESECA contains no authority to order that a
sale be made,98 FEA makes a finding only that coal with the correct
specifications will be available in the general geographic area 9
ESECA also requires FEA to find that "coal transportation facilities
will be available" during the period that FEA's order will be in
effect.'0 The practical nature of this requirement is readily apparent; in addition, the conferees hoped to stimulate a revival of rail
and barge traffic, as well as the development of coal slurry pipelines. '
Third, ESECA requires an FEA finding that each conversion
will be "practicable" and "consistent with the purposes of [the]
Act. 1 0 2 While Congress stated the purposes of ESECA,'"3 it did not
condition be applied in an overly rigid or strict fashion which would frustrate the intent
of the section to encourage burning of coal in lieu of petroleum products or natural gas.
H.R. REP. No. 1085, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1974). The definition of "capability and necessary
plant equipment" in FEA's regulations reflects this approach. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 305.3(6)(1),

.4(b)(1) (1976).
94. ESECA § 2(b)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 792(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
95. ESECA § 2(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 792(f)(2) (Supp. V, 1975).
96. Although usually some latitude is allowed for fuel quality when designing a
given boiler unit, there are definite limits to how much the fuel quality can vary. For
example, cyclone furnaces must use a coal with a low ash-fusion temperature because
they are designed for removal of ash in molten form and won't work with a coal having
a high ash-fusion temperature.
PIB, supra note 20, at 40.
97. 10 C.F.R. §§ 305.3(b)(3)(i), .4(b)(3)(i) (1976).
98. The ESECA coal allocation provisions do not explicitly authorize FEA to order that
a sale actually be made, nor do they authorize FEA to control prices or order that transportation be made available.
99. See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 20492-93 (1975) (findings in support of proposed prohibition
orders, Ames Electric Utility Powerplant 7).
100. ESECA § 2(b)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 792(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
101. For a statement of the problems perceived by Congress in this area, see FACS, supra
note 14, at 8-9. For a detailed analysis of the problems confronting greater use of coal slurry
pipelines, see Hearingson Coal Slurry PipelinesBefore the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials
and Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 228,
at 92-98, 169-72 (1974).
102. ESECA § 2(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 792(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V, 1975).
103. The purposes of ESECA include, inter alia, provision "for a means to assist in
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eludicidate upon the contents of this finding, and FEA has interpreted its mandate as requiring two separate findings. 04 According
to FEA's regulations, a prohibition order is "consistent with the
purposes" of ESECA, first, if it serves to discourage the use of
natural gas and petroleum products and second, if it requires protection of the environment "to the fullest extent practicable" while
burning coal.' The substitution of coal under an FEA order fulfills
the first "purpose" of ESECA; the second "purpose" is satisfied
when EPA approves coal burning in compliance with relevant clean
air requirements, and FEA completes a satisfactory environmental
analysis.' Congress did not define "practicability" in ESECA, nor
did it indicate at what point it intended that FEA find a prohibition
order to be "impracticable." Although it is cheaper to purchase coal
than oil, because of the possible need for environmental controls, it
does not always follow that it will be cheaper to burn coal. However,
ESECA does not require that FEA issue orders only to plants that
will profit by converting to coal; indeed, if profitability were the sine
qua non of coal substitution there would be no need for legislation
to mandate coal use. While Congress did not draw this line with
precision, it is clear that practicability does entail an economic test,
and FEA's regulations so provide. 07 In addition, in evaluating a
plant's ability to pay for conversion, FEA evaluates the impact, if
any, of coal substitution on consumer rates.'
Fourth, ESECA requires that FEA find, in the case of a powerplant (but not a major fuel burning installation), that a prohibition
order will not "impair the reliability of service in the area served by
such plant."' 19 FEA was to implement the congressional intent by
consulting with the Federal Power Commission in analyzing "relia' 0 and by performing a detailed
bility""
technical analysis in each
meeting the essential needs of the United States for fuels, in a manner which is consistent,
to the fullest extent practicable, with existing national commitments to protect and improve
the environment ....
" ESECA § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 791 (Supp. V, 1975).
104. See 10 C.F.R. § 305.3(b)(2) (1976) (for powerplants); id. § 305.4(b)(2) (for MFBI's).
105. Id.§ 305.3(b)(2)(ii) (for powerplants); id.§ 305.4(b)(2)(ii)(for MFBI's).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 305.3(b)(2)(i) (for powerplants); id.. § 305.4(b)(2)(i) (for MFBI's).
108. Federal Energy Administration, Press Release No. E-75-215, July 1, 1975.
109. ESECA § 2(b)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 792(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V, 1975).
110. While ESECA does not require FEA consultation with the Federal Power Commission, the conferees encouraged such consultation because conversion "may have implications
respecting adequacy and reliability of bulk power supply, matters within the FPC's jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act." H.R. REP. No. 1085, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1974).
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case, 1 which would culminate in a finding of whether conversion
of a powerplant to coal would mean "a significant increase in the
probability of loss of load" by the dispatching system, resulting in
a,"substantial hazard to commerce or the public health and
safety."" 2
1(b).

Prohibition Orders

FEA's own regulations establish the procedures by which it issues
a prohibition order. First, FEA issues to the plant, and publishes in
the FederalRegister, a notice of intent which states the grounds that
FEA believes justify issuance of a prohibition order. The notice
informs the plant and the public of FEA's proposed action, invites
comment on the facts therein, and sets the date for a public hearing." 3 Second, FEA conducts a hearing, at which the utility and the
public are invited to comment upon and, if necessary, correct FEA's
proposed findings. At this proceeding, which resembles a nonadjudicatory hearing under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act," 4 participants may submit questions, make oral presentations and speak in rebuttal."' Third, if FEA determines after analysis of comments and the hearing that it can still make the findings
required by ESECA, it issues a written, detailed prohibition order
to the plant in question."' Fourth, plants receiving an FEA order
must meet with EPA to arrive at an acceptable method of burning
coal in compliance with air pollution requirements." 7 After EPA
approves the compliance plan, it notifies FEA of the earliest date
upon which the plant can burn coal."' Fifth, FEA issues an
environmental assessment or impact statement, which details the
environmental effects of the order." 9 Sixth, if environmental considerations do not require material alteration of its order, FEA issues
a notice of effectiveness establishing the date on which the order
takes effect. 20 Thereafter, the plant may request that FEA either
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

10 C.F.R. § 305.3(b)(4)(i) (1976).
Id. § 305.3(b)(4)(ii).
Id. § 303.34(b).
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 20491-92 (1975).
10 C.F.R. § 303.37 (1976).
ESECA § 3(c)(2)(A)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10(c)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. V, 1975).
ESECA § 3(d)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10(d)(1)(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
10 C.F.R. § 305.9 (1976).
Id. 88 303.10(b), .37(b).
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modify or rescind its order' 2 ' or grant an exception or exemption,' 22
or the plant may appeal FEA's order.' 3 The plant may seek judicial
24
review only after administrative remedies have been exhausted.'
1(c).

ESECA and the Clean Air Act

In relation to existing plants, ESECA amended the Clean Air Act
and authorized EPA to cooperate with FEA in the coal substitution
effort. The Clean Air Act, which establishes ambitious timetables
to eliminate air pollution and provides for the adoption of state
emission limitations that are even more stringent than required to
protect public health, has been a major constraint to increased coal
use. The ESECA amendments to the Clean Air Act were intended
to ease some of these restrictions so that, while yet preserving the
public health, increased coal burning would be fostered. Briefly, the
Clean Air Act directs EPA to identify pollutants that have an adverse effect on health and welfare,' 25 and prescribe for each a "primary ambient air quality standard" to protect public health' and
a "secondary ambient air quality standard" to protect public welfare and economic values.' 7 The Act directs the states to adopt,
with EPA approval, state implementation plans (SIP's) which contain emission limitations and compliance schedules to attain primary standards by July 1, 1975, and secondary standards within a
"reasonable time" thereafter.' 28 The Clean Air Act specifically allows the states, in their SIP's, to adopt emission limitations and
controls that are more stringent than needed to achieve the ambient
air quality standards prescribed by EPA,'2 and, since 1970, many
states have done so. These limitations have created a demand for
clean fuel or its equivalent which exceeds the national supply such
that, if the original compliance timetables were maintained, it was
estimated that by 1975 more than half of the domestic coal con121. Id. §§ 303.140-148.
122. Id. §§ 303.70-.86.
123. Id. §§ 303.100-.110.
124. Id.
125. Clean Air Act § 108(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3(a)(1) (1970).
126. Id. § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(1) (1970). The "primary ambient air quality
standard" establishes air quality levels which, "allowing an adequate margin of safety, are
adequate to protect the public health." Id. (emphasis added).
127. Id. § 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(2) (1970).
128. Id. 88 110(a)(1), (2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(a)(1), (2) (1970), as amended (Supp. V,
1975).
129. Id. § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
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sumed by utilities would be unsuitable for further use without costly
environmental control equipment. 3 0 If emission limitations become
even more stringent, bulk fuel users will, if unconstrained, seek out
limited supplies of low-sulfur coal or switch to natural gas or imported oil. While it may be possible to use available high-sulfur coal
in conjunction with stack gas-scrubbing devices, "scrubbers" are
expensive, regarded by some as technologically unproven, and require 3 to 5 years to install. 3 '
The ESECA Clean Air Act amendments provide that for plants
that receive FEA orders but cannot secure coal to meet all SIP
requirements, 3 2 EPA may issue "compliance date extensions" that
protect public health but do not require the plant to meet more
stringent SIP requirements until December 31, 1978.' 31 In order to
receive an extension, the plant must meet "primary standard conditions ' ' 34 and applicable "regional limitations, ' ' 35 and it must submit an approvable plan to comply with these conditions throughout
the extension and to meet SIP requirements thereafter. 3 EPA may
revoke the extension at any time if the plant fails to meet the primary standard condition, the regional limitation, or the "significant
risk" provisions 37 of ESECA, or if it fails to follow its approved
compliance plan. At such time, FEA's prohibition order ceases to
3
be effective.' 1
2.

New Plants: Construction Orders

ESECA also authorizes FEA to require, with certain exceptions,
that a powerplant in the "early planning process" be designed and
constructed so as to be capable of using coal as its primary energy
source. 38 Congress limited FEA's authority in relation to new plants
by exempting combustion gas turbines and combined cycle units;
it also barred issuance of a construction order if FEA determines
130. FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, THE CLEAN FUELS DEFICIT: CLEAN AIR AcT PROBLEM
2 (1974).
131. Id. See also P11, supra note 20, at 66, and sources cited therein.
132. Clean Air Act § 119(c)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10(c)(2)(A) (Supp. V, 1975).
133. Id. §§ 119(c)(1), (c)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-10(c)(1), (c)(2)(C) (Supp. V, 1975).
134. Id. § 119(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V, 1975).
135. Id. § 119(c)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10(c)(2)(D) (Supp. V, 1975).
136. Id. § 119(c)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10(c)(2)(C) (Supp. V, 1975).
137. Id. § 119(d)(3)(B)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10(d)(3)(B)(iii) (Supp. V, 1975).
138. Id. §§ 119(d)(2)(C), (d)(3)(A), (B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-10(d)(2)(C), (d)(3)(A), (B)
(Supp. V, 1975).
139. ESECA § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 792(c) (Supp. V, 1975).
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that: "(1) . . . to do so is likely to result in an impairment of reliability or adequacy of service, or (2) an adequate and reliable supply
of coal is not expected to be available."' 40 In addition, before issuing
an order, Congress directed FEA to consider "the existence and
effects of any contractual commitment for the construction of such
facilities and the capability of the owner to recover any capital
investment made as a result of any requirement imposed under this
subsection."'' While ESECA does not define the "early planning
process" except by referring to it as "the design stage,'1 2 Congress
clearly intended to reach plants that are not yet far along in the
construction process. 4 3 Based upon construction and capital commitment practices in the utility industry, FEA defined the "early
planning process" as beginning ten years before the planned start
of commercial operation and ending at a named stage at the beginning of powerplant construction.'
FEA's construction orders are effective upon issuance."" ' These
orders require no EPA certification, and recipient plants are subject
to "new source performance standards" under the Clean Air Act.4
FEA expects to achieve substantial oil and gas savings by assuring
that these large new powerplants, which have long operating lives
ahead of them, use coal. The original ESECA, however, did not
assure this salutary result, for while FEA could order the installation of coal burning equipment-which is often installed as part of
a dual-fired boiler-it could not require that the powerplant actually use this capability to burn coal. As will be shown more fully
below, the recently enacted Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA) 47 rectified this situation by authorizing FEA to order that
construction order recipients burn coal when they come on line.
3.

Allocations

ESECA authorizes FEA, by rule or order, to "allocate coal (1) to
any powerplant or major fuel burning installation to which [a pro140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See H.R. REP. No. 1085, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1974).
143. 40 Fed. Reg. 20663-64 (1975).
144. 10 C.F.R. § 307.2 (1976).
145. 40 Fed. Reg. 5455 (1975).
146. See H.R. REP. No. 1085, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1974).
147. Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (amending scattered sections of 15, 42 U.S.C.
and adding 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (Supp. V, 1975)).
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hibition order] has been issued, or (2) to any other person to the
extent necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act."' 49 In addition, ESECA allows EPA to issue "fuel exchange designations"
where necessary to avoid or minimize the adverse impact on public
health and welfare of any prohibition order or allocation of fuel.149
Thereafter, unless FEA determines that the exchange will cause
excessive costs or consumption of fuel, FEA is directed to require
that the exchange of fuel be effective no later than 45 days after the
date of such designation. 5 " Finally, ESECA provides that any FEA
allocation program "shall, to the maximum extent practicable, include measures to assure that available low sulfur fuel will be distributed on a priority basis to those areas of the United States
designated by [EPA] as requiring low sulfur fuel to avoid or minimize adverse impact on public health."'' The Act does not, however, explicitly authorize FEA to order that a sale or contract be
made, or to dictate prices, or to assign transportation to carry coal.
On June 30, 1975, FEA issued regulations governing the allocation
of coal.' 52 To date, EPA has issued no "fuel exchange designations."
4.

Ancillary Provisions

As we have seen, during the eight months that Congress considered coal substitution legislation, the oil embargo ended and the
legislative sense of urgency about the "energy crisis" abated. Senator Muskie declared that the final bill was not "crisis-related" as
was its predecessor,'5 3 but with regard to air quality was intended
to "modify" and "narrow" the coal conversion provisions originally
reported by the House "to assure, at a minimum, protection of the
public health."' 54 In the bill as finally enacted, FEA's coal substitution authority is subject to several qualifications and limitations
which affect the size and timing of oil and gas savings attainable
by the program. By limiting FEA's coal substitution authority over
existing plants to those which had coal burning capability on the
148. ESECA § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 792(d) (Supp. V, 1975).
149. ESECA § 3(j)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 751(j)(1) (Supp. V, 1975). See also Clean Air Act §
119(j)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10(j)(1) (Supp. V, 1975).
150. ESECA § 3(j)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 751(j)(2) (Supp. V, 1975). See also Clean Air Act §
119(j)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10(j)(2) (Supp. V, 1975).
151. ESECA § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
152. 40 Fed. Reg. 28420-29 (1975).
153. 120 CONG. REC. 10407 (daily ed. June 12, 1974).
154. 120 CONG. Rmc. 8012 (daily ed. May 14, 1974).
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date of enactment, and for which FEA can make the other findings
required in the Act, Congress severely circumscribed the universe of
conversion candidates.'55 The provision that prohibition orders must
be rescinded or modified if any of the required findings is no longer
met' 6 mandates the creation of FEA review procedures, may give
plants the right to demand periodic re-readings of the ESECA criteria, and creates uncertainty about the duration of FEA's orders.
The requirement that FEA conduct public hearings before it issues
an order' 7 and that EPA hold similar hearings at various stages in
its proceedings for coal burning'58 has built administrative delays
into the initial steps of the conversion process. By originally limiting
FEA's authority to issue orders to June 30, 1975,' 9 and providing
that the orders would be enforceable only until December 31, 1978,1 °
ESECA reduced the size of attainable oil and gas savings, in large
part because the procedural and technical leadtimes for conversion
would have absorbed much of the order period. However, the EPCA
amendments which extend these deadlines can be expected to remedy this drawback.
Other impediments to the efficient exercise of coal substitution
authority are contained in ESECA. The Act's dual agency approach, at a minimum, delays conversion to coal by mandating
cumbersome FEA-EPA and EPA-source procedures. Thus, when
FEA issues its original order, it must base its "practicability" finding, in part, on the cost of the equipment that it estimates EPA will
require the plant to utilize.'6 ' Since FEA makes this finding before
EPA formally addresses the issue, it could be subject to revision.' 2
In addition, the ESECA requirement that the plant not burn coal
until it secures EPA approval' 3 injects procedural delay because of
the leadtimes necessary to formulate standards and arrive at a satisfactory compliance plan. Where a compliance date extension is
155. ESECA § 2(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. § 792(a), (b) (Supp. V, 1975).
156. Id. § 2(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 792(b)(1) (Supp. V, 1975).
157. Id. §§ 2(b)(2)(A), (3)(A), 15 U.S.C. §§ 792(b)(2)(A), (3)(A) (Supp. V, 1975).
158. E.g., id. §§ 3(b)(1), (c)(4), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-10(b)(1), (c)(4) (Supp. V, 1975).
159. Id. § 2(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 792(f)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
160. Id. § 2(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 792(f)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974), as amended (Supp. V, 1975).
161. Id. § 2(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 792(b)(3)(B) (Supp. V, 1975).
162. In the preamble to its final coal conversion regulations, FEA recognized that this
possibility existed, and that it could, in the case of "substantial changes," give rise to a
motion to modify or rescind the underlying prohibition order. 40 Fed. Reg. 20465 (1975).
163. ESECA §§ 3(c)(2)(A)(iii), (d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-10(c)(2)(A)(iii), (d)(2)(A)
(Supp. V, 1975).
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needed, the beginning of coal burning-and of oil and gas savings-is delayed by the necessity for EPA to hold public hearings. 4
Finally, ESECA's environmental protections give rise to uncertainties because, at any time during the duration of a compliance date
extension, the coal burning source is subject to charges, a public
hearing, revocation of its extension, and an enforcement proceed65
ing.1
C.

Implementation of ESECA: The First Year

From the outset, FEA's objective in implementing ESECA was to
"achieve as many of the oil savings realiz[able] under the provisions of ESECA as possible" at the earliest time. FEA concentrated
on achieving near-term savings by converting those existing oil and
gas fired powerplants that were most readily convertible under the
terms of the Act. In addition, FEA secured larger long-term savings
by issuing orders to powerplants in the "early planning process."
Because of the low priority assigned by Congress, and the formidable task of candidate identification, FEA did not issue orders to any
major fuel burning installations in 1975. The major program milestones of that year were reached when FEA prepared environmental
documents, issued regulations, held hearings and issued orders to a
number of powerplants.1"1
On January 31, 1975, FEA issued a draft environmental impact
statement identifying the foreseeable effects of the coal substitution
program on the environment if different numbers of plants were
converted. 7 After a public hearing and analysis of comments, FEA
issued a final programmatic environmental impact statement on
April 25, 1975.118 On February 5, 1975, FEA published proposed
regulations for the ESECA program in the FederalRegister."69 After
public hearing and analysis of comments, FEA, on May 9, 1975,
published the final procedural and substantive regulations for the
ESECA program. 7 0 Between May 9 and June 9, 1975, FEA issued
notices of intent and held hearings on prohibition orders for 74 boil164. Id. § 3(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10(c)(4) (Supp. V, 1975).
165. Id. § 3(d)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10(d)(3)(A) (Supp. V, 1975).
166. 120 CONG. REC. 7420-22 (daily ed. May 5, 1975) (FEA report to Congress).
167. 40 Fed. Reg. 4777 (1975).
168. Id. at 18215. As mentioned in the text, supra, FEA is continuing environmental
analysis in this respect.
169. Id. at 5452-57.
170. Id. at 20462-90.
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ers at 32 utility generating stations. After analysis of the arguments
and comments in each case, FEA issued prohibition orders to all of
these powerplants. 7 1 FEA and Senator Randolph estimate that,
when all of these orders are put into effect, the nation will save more
than 287 million barrels of oil per year and 104 billion cubic feet of
natural gas, and that 6.5 million additional tons of coal will be
substituted therefor. "2 On June 20, 1975, FEA issued notices of
intent to issue construction orders to 74 boilers at 46 planned utility
generating stations in the "early planning process" and on June 30,
1975, issued construction orders to all of these plants.' Because of
the long construction leadtimes, FEA has been unable to estimate
the expected savings in oil and gas use from these orders.
Contrary to some earlier predictions, no companies or citizen
groups sued to enjoin FEA from issuing orders prior to its initial
June 30, 1975, ESECA deadline.' 7 4 As of this writing, no suits have
been brought to test in court FEA's exercise of its ESECA authority,
although this may be because of the leadtimes built into FEA's
appeals system and the requirement that administrative remedies
be exhausted. During this period, FEA also took the initial steps
toward converting "major fuel burning installations" (MFBI's) to
coal. FEA's regulations define MFBI's as facilities capable of burning 100 million Btu's or more per hour. "' In order to identify MFBI's
that had coal burning capability on June 22, 1974, FEA began to
compile the first government inventory of MFBI equipment and
energy consumption. Based on preliminary analysis of responses to
its questionnaire, FEA estimated in June 1975 that there were approximately 4,000 MFBI's in the nation and that conversion of eligible candidates under ESECA would yield "perhaps the equivalent
of 300,000 bbls/day."'7' FEA Administrator Zarb observed, "This
171. Id. at 20491, 21516, 22171, 22305, 23522, 23530, 23926, 28430.
172. 122 CONG. REC. 5897-901 (daily ed. April 26, 1976).
173. 40 Fed. Reg. 28430 (1975). See also Federal Energy Administration, Press Release No.
E-75-216, July 1, 1975; Joint Hearingson the National Fuels and Energy Policy Study Before
the Senate Comm's on Interiorand InsularAflairs and Public Works Pursuant to S. Res. 45,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 18, at 2454 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearings on S. 1777.
174. See Platt's Oilgram, Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1975, at 7, col. 1.
175. 10 C.F.R. § 305.4(b)(1) (1976). FEA Administrator Zarb explained that these plants
fit within the parameters of the Act because they "are large enough to yield substantial oil
or gas savings, and their size makes it probable that they would best be able to afford the
initial costs of conversion." See Joint Hearings on S. 1777, supra note 173, at 1672.
176. Joint Hearings on S. 1777, supra note 173, at 1672.
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inventory will prove invaluable for future planning efforts, and will
serve us especially well should another oil embargo be imposed."' 77
D.

Existing Coal Burners: Part215

As indicated above, as early as November 8, 1973, President
Nixon promised "administrative action" to prevent plants that were
burning coal from converting to oil or natural gas. On November 27,
1973, the Energy Policy Office issued EPO regulation 2, which went
into effect on December 7, 1973.178 That regulation, which is now
part 215 of FEA's regulations, prevents certain conversions from
coal by prohibiting the sale or use of petroleum for burning under
power generators that were not using petroleum on December 7,
1973. 71 Part 215 allows affected plants to seek an exception if the
state certifies that the use of petroleum is "essential" to meet primary ambient air quality standards'80 or if compliance would cause
"special hardship, inequity, or unfair distribution of burdens."'' As
of January 1976, FEA had denied 13 applications to convert to oil
use, but had granted the relief requested, in whole or in part, in 11
other cases.8 2 Due to the recent EPCA amendments, part 215 could
remain in effect until September 30, 1981.183
E. ESECA Extension
On January 30, 1975, President Ford submitted to Congress
amendments to broaden FEA's coal substitution jurisdiction and to
extend its authority to issue orders until June 30, 1977.184 Subsequently, on three occasions, Congress passed extensions of FEA's
ESECA authority as part of broader bills; these bills were vetoed
by the President.'85 After prolonged consideration, Congress then
177. Id.
178. 38 Fed. Reg. 32577 (1973).
179. 10 C.F.R. § 215.3 (1976).
180. Id. § 215.6(a).
181. Id. § 215.6(b).
182. See CCH Fed. Energy Guidelines Exc. & App. Dec. 80409 (1975); id. at 20016 (1974).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 760g (Supp. V. 1975).
184. Hearings on the Economic Impact of President Ford's Energy Program Before the
Senate Comm. on Interiorand Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 6, at 380, 405-06
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on President Ford's Energy Program].
185. S. 1849, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)(Emergency Petroleum Allocation Extension Act
of 1975), 121 CONG. REc. 15609 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1975); H.R. 4035, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975) (Petroleum Price Review Act), 121 CONG. REc. 7202 (daily ed. July 22, 1975); H.R. 25,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1975), 121 CONG.
REc. 4405 (daily ed. May 20, 1975).
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passed' 0 the omnibus Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA)
which the President signed into law on December 22, 1975.181 With
regard to coal substitution, EPCA (1) extends FEA's order issuance
authority until June 30, 1977, and the duration of orders until December 31, 1984,111 (2) authorizes FEA to issue prohibition orders to
new classes of plants,' 9 and (3) expands FEA's authority to issue
construction orders to "major fuel burning installations."'' 10 By renewing FEA's authority to issue orders, the EPCA amendments
assure continuation of the federal coal substitution program, and
provide the long leadtimes that are sometimes necessary to convert
to coal within the purview of an ESECA order. The expansion of
FEA authority to new classes of plants will yield additional savings
of oil and gas, and the extension of orders until 1985 will increase
the savings from each order that is issued.
F. ESECA and the National Energy Effort
In the years since the oil embargo, the national energy debate has
focused primarily on petroleum and natural gas issues, the role of
nuclear power, and the development of conservation strategies to
dampen demand for all energy. During this period, there have been
exhortations to increase the use of our most abundant fossil fuel
resource, but, as Arnold Miller, president of the United Mine Workers of America observed, "each piece of legislation offered to deal
with the energy crisis has coal playing second fiddle to oil and other
' 9
more exotic and unproven forms of energy. ' '
In ESECA, Congress intended to create a limited program to
increase the use of domestic coal; it recognized that the relatively
modest savings of oil and gas that can be achieved within the framework of the Act will not alone solve our energy problems. However,
186. 121 CONG. REC. 21487 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1975).
187. Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (amending scattered sections of 15, 42 U.S.C.
and adding 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (Supp. V, 1975)).
188. Id. § 101(a), 89 Stat. 875, amending 15 U.S.C. § 792(f) (Supp. IV, 1974) (now codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 792(f) (Supp. V, 1975)).
189. Id. § 101(b), amending 15 U.S.C. § 792(a) (Supp. IV, 1974) (now codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 792(a) (Supp. V, 1975)). EPCA extends FEA's original ESECA jurisdiction to--include
powerplants and major fuel burning installations that acquired coal burning capability after
June 22, 1974, or are eligible for, or receive, a "construction requirement under subsection
(c)." Id.
190. Id. § 101(c), amending 15 U.S.C. § 792(c) (Supp. IV, 1974) (now codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 79 2 (c) (Supp. V, 1975)).
191. Joint Hearings on S. 1777, supra note 173, at 1453.
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because of the long leadtimes needed to change energy use patterns
and develop new energy sources, FEA Administrator Zarb has recognized that the ESECA program and development of the Naval
Petroleum Reserves are "the only supply actions that can have
much effect during the next two to three years."'' 2
In practice, FEA has found that compliance with the environmental criteria in ESECA will substantially delay substitution of coal,
for a number of technological reasons. Approximately 75 percent of
powerplant candidates will need new air pollution control equipment to burn coal, and coal substitution will be delayed by the long
leadtimes needed to install electrostatic precipitators (28 to 32
9 3
months) and flue gas desulfurization equipment (3 to 5 years).
While many air pollution requirements could be met by burning low
sulfur coal, because it takes 3 to 5 years to open a new underground
coal mine, short-run coal substitution (1975-1977) will be limited by
the availability of such coal from existing mines. In 1975, FEA concluded that an adequate supply of low-sulfur coal will support substitution requirements in the long-term (1977-1980) if "a clear longterm market for coal exists so that mine operators will be willing to
invest the required capital in new mine development."' 9 4
FEA has found that the long leadtimes needed to meet environmental restrictions cause the major delay for coal substitution and
that out of 80 "prime" powerplant candidates which would be able
to burn coal by 1980, only 7 boilers would have been able to use coal
as of May 1975, and only 24 would be able to use coal by 1977.111
The impact of ESECA's environmental restrictions is expressed in
FEA's and EPA's recommendations that the "regional
limitation"-which will delay many switches to coal-be deleted
from the Act.9 6 If that provision is deleted, public health would
continue to be protected, while reduced equipment procurement
problems would accelerate boiler conversion to coal use. For example, in the absence of the regional limitation, 19 boilers (instead of
just 7) could have converted as of May 1975 and 37 boilers (instead
192. Hearingson President Ford's Energy Program, supra note 184, at 12.
193. Joint Hearings on S. 1777, supra note 173, at 227.
194. 121 CONG. REC. 7421 (daily ed. May 5, 1975) (FEA report to Congress).
195. Id. at 7420.
196. Hearingson Implementation of the Clean Air Act Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. H10, pt.
1, at 149, 334 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Clean Air Act Hearings].
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of 24) would be able to convert by 1977.17
The EPCA extension will allow FEA to continue to order coal
substitution within the environmental constraints of ESECA. Based
on preliminary data, FEA Administrator Zarb has estimated that
the extension will allow FEA to issue orders both to existing and new
powerplants, and to major fuel burning installations that will yield
between 600,000 and 900,000 barrels of oil savings per day by 1985.11,
This substitution, which would allow petroleum and natural gas to
be reordered to higher uses than steam production, would require
the additional production of from 55 to 82 million tons of coal per
year by 1985.'11
However, ESECA, as extended by the EPCA amendments, will
not create a dramatic large-scale demand for coal. In relation to
existing plants, ESECA remains reconversion legislation, and
FEA's role is to identify and issue orders to plants that meet the
criteria in the Act. While ESECA provides some leeway, FEA is
basically without authority to order a plant to take steps to make
itself qualify for a conversion order. Under ESECA, FEA is also
without authority to deal with the underlying constraints to increased coal use. Instead, if large-scale coal substitution is to be a
serious national goal, new efforts must be made to address the constraints to increased coal use and to encourage plants to take affirmative steps to bum coal. It is to consideration of a bill offered for
that broader purpose, S. 1777, that we now turn.
III.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

A.

S. 1777

1. Purpose
On May 20, 1975, Senators Randolph, Jackson and Magnuson
introduced S. 1777, the "National Petroleum and Natural Gas Conservation Act of 1975." In his introductory statement, Senator Randolph stressed that "energy independence" problems continued in
the wake of the embargo and that part of the solution lay in in197.
198.
199.
barrels

121 CONG. REC. 7420 (daily ed. May 5, 1975).
Joint Hearings on S. 1777, supra note 173, at 331, 333.
FEA estimates that one ton of coal is the energy equivalent of approximately 4-1/3
of oil. PIB, supra note 20, at 3.
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creased reliance on domestic coal. Based upon FEA's experience
under ESECA, the senators introduced S. 1777 and conducted extensive hearings to determine the feasibility of substituting coal for
oil and gas in a broader range of utility and industrial boilers. m°
After amassing a wealth of material about the potential for increased coal use, the Senate issued a revised draft of S. 1777 which
is summarized below.
Even before introduction of S. 1777, Ford Administration and
congressional energy planners had called for huge increases in coal
production and use by 1985. According to Senator Randolph, these
projections will be met only by aggressive government action in
pursuit of an overall program and S. 1777 is an initial step toward
a "definitive National Coal Policy from the mine face to the ultimate energy user.""'' While S.1777 does not attempt to address coal
supply-related issues such as surface mining, coal leasing policies or
the use of coal for synthetic fuels, the bill does go far toward
addressing the "demand" side of the coal development equation.
2.

Summary of Provisions

S. 1777 would require "new" 2 2 fossil fuel fired powerplants 3 or
"major industrial installations" (MII's)0 4 to make themselves capable of burning coal as their "primary energy source"2 5 in compliance
with environmental requirements. 0 New facilities may not use gas
after January 1, 1979,207 or petroleum after January 1, 1989,08 unless
200. Joint Hearings on S. 1777, supra note 173, at 15-17, 19-20.
201. Id. at 16, 21.
202. S. 1777, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(h) (1975) defines "new" powerplant or installation as a "facility which was in the early planning process, as ... defined [in ESECA] . . .
as of the date of enactment of this Act." S. 1777 is reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON
PUBLIC WORKS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., S. 1777 (Staff Working Print No. 2, 1976).
203. An "electric powerplant" is defined as a fossil fuel fired unit that produces electric
power for sale or exchange, and that has design capability of firing at a heat-rate of 100 million
Btu's per hour or greater; or a combination of units that are capable in the aggregate of being
fired at 250 million Btu's per hour or greater; or smaller units where FEA finds inclusion
under the Act to be "practicable." S. 1777, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(f) (1975).
204. The definition of "major industrial installation" is similar to that of "electric powerplant," supra note 203, except that there is no requirement that the facility produce electricity for sale or exchange. Id. § 102(g).
205. "Primary energy source" is defined as all fuel used by a facility except for amounts
required (1) for "boiler start-up, testing, flame stabilization, control uses, and fuel preparation"; or (2) "to alleviate acute short-term air quality emergencies"; or (3) "to alleviate
any emergencies directly affecting the public health, safety, and welfare which would be
caused by electric power outages." Id. § 102(j).
206. Id. § 108(b).
207. Id. § 104(b).
208. Id. § 104(c).
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they pay a civil penalty 09 levied on a graduating scale over time.210
After January 1, 1979, existing powerplants or MII's may operate
only if they burn coal in conformity with environmental requirements or if they are capable of using only oil or gas and FEA finds
that conversion to coal is not "practicable."'I After that date, existing facilities may use gas only if FEA finds that conversion to coal
or oil is not practicable 12 or if they pay a penalty;"' the same treatment is accorded to oil burning facilities after January 1, 1985.214 In
addition, after January 1, 1985, no facility may operate on oil or gas
unless FEA finds that conversion to coal in conformity with applica15
ble environmental requirements is not practicable.
S. 1777 would authorize FEA to grant "compliance date extensions,"2 6 temporary "exemptions," ' and permanent exemptions (if
conversion is not practicable)'" from the requirements listed above.
The bill attempts to mitigate the effects of losing a favorable fuel
contract 2 9 and establishes a system whereby plants must procure
"certifications of conformance ' 20 with applicable environmental
requirements from the EPA or the state.' It would also require FEA
to use its ESECA coal allocation authority in certain circumstances. 22 Finally, S. 1777 would amend ESECA to allow FEA to order
powerplants and major industrial installations to convert from natural gas to oil if conversion to coal is impracticable and if certain
2
findings can be made. 2
209. Id. § 111(g).
210. Id. §§ 111(e), (f).
211. Id. §§ 105(a)(1), (a)(2), (3).
212. Id. § 105(b).
213. Id. § 111(e).
214. Id. § 105(c).
215. Id. § 105(d).
216. Id. § 106(a). This section allows FEA to extend deadlines for three years if (1) the
extension is necessary to render conversion "practicable" and the facility is committed to a
compliance plan; (2) "unexpected events" beyond the owner's control make retrofit not
"practicable" or (3) despite good faith efforts, fuel, coal burning or pollution control equipment cannot be secured by the deadline.
217. Id. § 106(b). This section allows FEA to exempt facilities from deadlines for periods
during which, despite good faith efforts, fuel or fuel transportation facilities are not available.
218. Id. § 107.
219. Id. §§ 109(a), (b).
220. Id. § 108.
221. Section 102(k) defines "applicable environmental requirements" to include "any"
federal or state air or water "standard or limitation" and requirements relating to solid waste
disposal. Id. § 102(k).
222. Id. § 112(a).
223. Id. § 202.
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S. 1777 and ESECA

S. 1777 and ESECA both seek to increase coal use and production,
by stimulating demand. However, S. 1777 is intended to be broader
than its predecessor, and it would apparently affect more plants and
create a different type of federal program-in contrast to the limited
program created by ESECA, S. 1777 is aimed at achieving permanent, large-scale coal substitution.
First, S. 1777 goes beyond ESECA's reconversion objective to
require that existing powerplants and industrial facilities install
coal burning equipment, even on a first-time basis. The American
Boiler Manufacturer's Association (ABMA) estimated that the 50
million Btu's per hour jurisdictional rate in the original S. 1777
would require conversion of approximately 100 megawatts of oil and
gas fired powerplant boilers and as many as 42,000 boilers in 17,000
other facilities. ABMA estimated that it would be impossible to
retrofit many of these boilers and that the replacement (not conversion) cost of boilers for these powerplants and facilities would be
approximately $98 billion. 224 ABMA's "ballpark" estimate is admittedly on the high side because the number of plants actually affected would be reduced by (1) S. 1777's "practicability" exemption
and (2) the standard in the revised bill which raises the jurisdictional size for boiler conversion to 100 million Btu's per hour firing
rate.22 5 It is clear, however, that the broad nature of S. 1777's "practicability" criteria makes it difficult to determine the numbers of
plants that would be required to substitute coal under the bill.
Second, in contrast to ESECA, which requires FEA to identify
candidates and make four findings before ordering coal substitution,
S. 1777 compels coal substitution or payment of fees unless FEA,
upon application, grants an exception or an exemption. Even if a
plant eventually does not have to convert, the action-forcing provisions of S. 1777 require all facilities that meet the size criterion to
file exceptions and/or take steps to order boiler and pollution control
equipment to meet the deadlines in the bill. Sizeable governmental
programs would be needed to determine the validity of applications
and to issue environmental certificates of compliance, and industry
would be required to take a series of actions to achieve coal substitu224.
225.

Joint Hearingson S. 1777, supra note 173, at 1713, 1721.
Id. at 1729.
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tion, including the filing of detailed progress reports with the gov2
ernment.1
Third, in contrast to ESECA, S. 1777 does not provide for extensions to meet environmental regulations or for federal preemption
of state and local environmental standards. Facilities that convert
would be required to meet Clean Air Act standards applicable to
new plants, and to install equipment that is adequate to meet all
applicable air, water and waste disposal regulations. 2 1
Efforts to achieve energy independence via S. 1777 would strain
domestic heavy machinery capacity because a sizeable number of
plants would apparently have to install pollution control and coal
burning equipment within a relatively short period of time. The
demand generated by S. 1777 would compete for available steel with
equipment needed to develop oil, gas and alternative fuels. This
competition would be especially intense for equipment needed to
burn coal since, as shown above, FEA's "new plant" construction
orders already require that a large number of power plants scheduled to come on line within the next ten years be built with coal
burning capability. S. 1777's requirement that existing plants be
retrofitted to burn coal is especially arduous, for retrofit requires
custom work and careful scheduling to avoid disruption of
operations. In its "high" estimate of S. 1777's impact, ABMA estimated that it would take a "monumental effort, possibly exceeding
the boiler industry's ship-propulsion World War II effort . . .to
meet the coal conversion objectives of the bill within the timeframe

constraints imposed. "228
S. 1777 will also make substantial demands upon the utility industry, which has been in a weakened financial condition for the last
five years. Even before ESECA, the utilities had embarked upon an
enormous program of expansion to meet projected demand, which
included planned construction of nuclear as well as fossil fuel fired
powerplants. The utilities have had problems financing this construction because of the difficulty of attracting debt and equity
capital in a tight money market. Utilities have had problems selling
226. To some degree, these administrative problems may be mitigated by S. 1777's novel
"civil penalty" approach which, in contrast to the approach in ESECA, would allow a plant
to continue to burn oil or gas without an extension if it pays a premium to do so. See also
note 196 supra.
227. S. 1777, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 108 (1975).
228. Joint Hearings on S. 1777, supra note 173, at 1728.
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common stock, which is often offered at depressed rates even below
book value and, in many instances, utility bond ratings have been
lowered. To compound these problems, fluctuating energy use patterns since 1974 have prevented the utilities from accurately forecasting future energy demand, which is the baseline from which the
industry makes its plans to install new capacity.2 9
If S. 1777 is enacted in its present form, it can be expected to
create many more jobs for Americans. UMW president Arnold
Miller estimates that the mining force will increase from approximately 120,000 to nearly 350,000 miners by 1985 if S. 1777 is fully
implemented. 3 The program would also apparently stimulate investment and create jobs on the railroads and in the steel and
equipment-producing industries that comprise the coal distribution
infra-structure. On the other hand, the requirement that existing
industrial installations be retrofitted to burn coal may also require
temporary plant closures, and this could cause some loss of employment for affected employees.
In order to deal with the foregoing impacts, S. 1777 could itself
generate demands for additional governmental intervention in the
economic and social life of the nation. While the capital and job
shifting impacts between sectors of the economy are potentially
massive, the true effects of the program appear to be unquantifiable
at this time. It is clear, however, that S. 1777 would expand the
regulation of energy use, and government might be called upon to
adjust and moderate the ripple effects of so broad a program on the
nation.
S. 1777 has surfaced at a time when real questions are being raised
about the merits of the "free market" versus the "regulatory" approach to all government activities, and to the energy field in particular. 3 ' The Ford Administration has shared Senator Randolph's
view that we must increase our reliance on domestic coal and that
229. Hearings on Electric Utility Policy Issues Before the Senate Comm. on Interiorand
Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 45, at 115, 120, 123-25, 137 (1974) (report on "Utility
Financing Problems and National Energy Policy," by National Economic Research Associates, Inc., July 11, 1974). See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1975, at 33, col. 1.
230. Joint Hearingson S. 1777, supra note 173, at 1457.
231. For a useful analysis of the "free market" and "government intervention" approaches, with special reference to the "unique" situation in the minerals extraction industries, see PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS, MATERIALS SHORTAGES, S. Doc. No. 338, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 11, 16 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as MATERIALS SHORTAGES].
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it is wasteful to use oil and gas for steam production purposes. '2 The
Administration, however, generally has opposed additional government regulation of economic life, '3 a view which is shared by influential legislative policy-makers in the field of energy.2 34 The Administration's many proposals for energy legislation have been structured to allow the "free market" to allocate goods and services and
decide questions of individual energy use,2 35 the preferred vehicle to
increased coal use being the pricing mechanism. It is intended that
deregulation of coal's major competitors-oil and gas-will cause
their prices to increase and thus make coal more attractive as a
boiler fuel for steam generation purposes. 3 To some degree, this
appears to be happening already since, in apparent response to price
differentials and supply reliability considerations, increasing num-37
bers of utilities are planning to utilize coal in new powerplants.1
Industry witnesses at the hearings on S. 1777 also voiced support for
the "free market" approach, which would allow for energy choices
based on economic considerations and would avoid the panoply of
legal and financial burdens that often accompany increased govern23
ment regulation.
On the other hand, some Congressional leaders are dubious about
the value of the "pricing mechanism ' ' 3 1 and believe that integrated
national planning and a regulatory approach will be necessary to
solve the many problems associated with redirecting our energy
reliance to coal. 4 ' Indeed, there is a growing belief that the energy
sector of the economy may be sui generisI and there is a question232. In his statement on S. 1777, FEA Administrator Frank Zarb noted that "while we
vigorously support the basic goals of the bill, I have reservations about some of its detailed
provisions and about its mechanisms of implementation." Joint Hearings on S. 1777, supra
note 173, at 1671.
233. This position was restated recently by Paul MacAvoy, a member of the President's
Council of Economic Advisers, who noted that "the considerable costs of regulation have been
borne for too long," and that "the economic arguments for total deregulation are appealing,
particularly in natural gas and transportation." Weekly Energy Report, Sept. 15, 1975, at 4.
234. See, e.g., Hearingson President Ford's Energy Program, supra note 184, at 44, 141.
235. Id. at 12.
236. Id. at 74-75.
237. See Joint Hearings on S. 1777, supra note 173, at 51. According to the National Coal
Association, 48.2 percent of new utility capacity scheduled to come on line between 1975 and
1979 is coal-fired, while nuclear (32.5), oil (15.3) and gas (4.0) account for smaller shares of
new capacity. Id.
238. Id. at 795.
239. See, e.g., Hearings on President Ford's Energy Program, supra note 184, at 2.
240. Joint Hearings on S. 1777, supra note 173, at 21-22.
241. See MATERIALS SHORTAGES, supra note 231, at 11. See generally D. SCHWARTZ, ENERGY
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ing of the ability of the economic approach alone to meet the many
problems associated with coal substitution in the next decade.2 ,2
In fact, for the last thirty years, there has not been a "free market" for energy resources; rather, there has been a hybrid system of
regulation, incentives for special interests, and laissez faire.2 3 This
system has not resulted in the optimal development of our domestic
energy resources and, while this was not of major concern in the
1950's and 1960's, it has now become crucial to our national energy
policy.
Coal has not been, and is not now, competing with oil or gas in a
classic free market. Political realities make it questionable whether
there will be deregulation of natural gas prices in the near future.
History suggests that it is too early to predict whether oil will be
subject to continuing regulatory constraints. In view of the many
regulatory uncertainties affecting coal extraction and use, it is also
questionable whether small price differentials will be sufficient to
induce industry to choose coal over oil or gas. However, whether the
"free market" or "regulatory" approach is finally adopted, in order
to achieve this goal, a conscious national policy is needed to determine the role that coal should play in our national energy budget
and to coordinate the myriad of laws and regulations governing its
extraction and use to facilitate that end.
B.

Constraintsto Increased Coal Substitution

The United States has enormous reserves of coal, equal to onefifth of the total world reserves. 4 As shown above, in the wake of
the embargo, both the President and congressional leaders have
called for the virtual doubling of domestic coal production by
1985.245 However, witnesses at the hearings on S. 1777 questioned
CRISIS: THE MIssiNc. LINK

(1975).

242. Joint Hearings on S. 1777, supra note 173, at 1005.
243. See A TIME TO CHOOSE, supra note 7, at 7-11.
244. Until recently, the Department of Interior estimated that the United States possesses
3,200 billion tons of coal, of which 434 billion tons constituted a "demonstrated coal reserve
base" (i.e., coal that was "minable with today's technology and economics"), FACS, supra
note 14, at 3. As a result of expanded study and exploration, however, in October 1975, the
Department's U.S. Geological Survey increased its estimate of total U.S. coal reserves to
almost 4 trillion tons (3,968 billion), and decreased its estimate of readily recoverable reserves
to 198 billion tons. See Journal of Commerce, Oct. 7, 1975, at 26.
245. The comprehensive congressional program on energy and the economy called for an
increase of coal production from 695 million tons in 1975 (estimated production) to 1.4 billion
tons by 1985. According to Senator Randolph, the program announced by President Ford in
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whether adequate coal can be made available to support large-scale
coal substitution in the near future, in view of the constraints dealt
with below.24
Prospects for increasing coal substitution in the future hinge upon
the coal industry's ability to attract the capital required to open new
mines. Because of the large initial expenditures required and the
long leadtimes necessary to recoup investment, 47 needed capital
will not be forthcoming unless there is an assured long-term demand
for coal at prices high enough to encourage investment.24
The president of the National Coal Association, Carl Bagge, has
stressed that coal has always been a risky investment, that demand
has been subject to wide fluctuations, and that a production chart
for the last 50 years resembles a "roller coaster. ' 2 4 9 As mentioned
earlier, in the past, these fluctuations were caused largely by direct
competition for markets from newly developing fuels, such as oil,
gas and nuclear energy. More recently, however, this situation has
changed and coal development has been hampered not so much by
direct competition from other fuels as by major uncertainties about
government policies which affect the cost and demand for coal, such
as those limiting its extraction and use, and by federal pricing policies.
Of course, every industry has doubts about long-term returns on
investment and, as Justice Cardozo long ago observed, some uncertainty is endemic to all aspects of human intercourse that are
touched by law.2"0 However, as Carl Bagge has pointed out, the
uncertainties about future regulations affecting coal use are so numerous as to deter investment in new mines, and they have "been
passed along to equipment manufacturers, coal hauling railroads
his 1975 State of the Union Message would require production of 1.1 billion tons by 1985. Joint
Hearingson S. 1777, supra note 173, at 2.
246. Id. at 1002, 1012, 1014.
247. "A coal mine represents a 20 to 25 year investment which must be recovered, plus a
return, over that period." FACS, supra note 14, at 10.
248. Id. See also PIB, supra note 20, at 57.
249. Joint Hearings on S. 1777, supra note 173, at 37.
250. See B. CARDOZO, GROWTH OF THE LAW 19 (13th ed. 1966) (quoting in part from Aristotle):
Overemphasis of certainty may carry us to the worship of an intolerable rigidity. If we
were to state the law today as well as human minds can state it, new problems, arising
almost overnight, would encumber the ground again. "As in other sciences, so in
politics, it is impossible that all things should be precisely set down in writing; for
enactments must be universal, but actions are concerned with particulars."
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and the whole complex involved in expanding coal industry production and transportation.""'
First and foremost, industry witnesses at the S. 1777 hearings
stressed that uncertainties about the costs of constantly changing
environmental regulation are a major constraint to making a decision to burn coal. Since the late 1960's, the people of the United
States have focused an extraordinary amount of attention on newlyperceived environmental problems, and Congress has responded
with a flood of legislation. For example, 189 public laws were enacted during the 92d Congress to protect the environment and natural resources; this represents almost one-third of all legislation en22
acted by that Congress. 1
As this article is being written, the laws that most affect coal
substitution are being changed again, for Congress is working on farreaching amendments to tighten the Clean Air Act.32 These include
provisions requiring the "prevention of significant deterioration" of
'255
air quality 254 and the use of "best available control technology,
which industry perceives as prohibiting or substantially increasing
the cost of coal utilization and intensifying the "scrubber" controversy. 25 Other amendments under consideration, such as those
which would penalize sources that failed to meet ambient air quality standards by the dates required in applicable SIP's, 2 571 also appear to fall most heavily on coal burning plants.2 58 In an amendment
that can only confuse those who seek to ascertain a consistent direction in national policy, Congress is considering changing the rules
concerning ESECA compliance date extensions. Although ESECA
encourages coal burning by authorizing federal preemption of nonhealth related clean air standards, the pending bills would end this
arrangement and if enacted could void any compliance extensions
that EPA may issue-it has issued none to date for FEA orders since
June 30, 1975-under the ESECA program before the amendments
251. Joint Hearings on S. 1777, supra note 173, at 54.
252. Dreyfus & Grundy, Influence of the Energy Crisis Upon the Future of Environmental
Policy, 3 ENVIRON. AFFAIRS 253, 271 n.30 (1974).
253. S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as S. 3219]; H.R. 10498, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 10498].
254. S. 3219, supra note 253, § 5; H.R. 10498, supra note 253, § 108.
255. S. 3219, supra note 253, § 6.
256. Weekly Energy Report, Jan. 5, 1976, at 5.
257. S. 3219, supra note 253, § 9(b); H.R. 10498, supra note 253, § 104. See also id. § 105.
258. See Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 196, at 193-95, 197-98.
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take effect. "9 Upon convening in January of 1977, the 95th Congress
will consider a conference report regarding these bills.8 0
In a related development, more uncertainty was injected into the
coal demand picture when EPA revealed that it is investigating
previously unsuspected health effects of coal-related substances,
including "fine particulates," "fugitive dust," and sulfates, and
might issue regulations requiring coal users to control these emissions.2'
The continuing uncertainty about coal and the environment, and
its inhibiting effect on decisions to use coal, is well illustrated by
the "scrubber" controversy. Flue gas desulfurization (FGD), or
"scrubbing" equipment, is intended to remove suflur dioxide (SO)
from coal emissions and, if effective, would permit utilities and
major installations to burn available high sulfur coal without violating air quality regulations for So. In the June 1974 debates leading
to passage of ESECA, Senator Baker questioned the reliability of
scrubbers, observing that they experience problems of "scaling and
clogging" and compound environmental problems by generating
large amounts of waste sludge. He expressed the hope that EPA
would not order powerplants to install scrubbers before they are
proven "reliable, efficient and cost effective."2 ' After additional
study, the EPA, in May 1975, went on record before the Senate as
stating that scrubbers had been demonstrated to be reliable, that
the basic technological problems associated with FGD systems had
been solved or were within the scope of current engineering and that
FGD systems could be applied at reasonable costs." 3
However, EPA Administrator Russell Train has admitted that
scrubbers themselves impose an energy penalty, equal to 6 percent
of emissions, on plants that use them, and that they would add as
259. The Senate amendment would end ESECA extensions by requiring new applications
from all holders of extensions and by predicating the grant of new extensions on factors other
than those applicable to ESECA order recipients. S. 3219, supra note 253, §§ 9(a), 15. The
House amendments would permit any outstanding compliance date extensions for coal conversion to continue, but would terminate the central feature of ESECA-federal preemption
of "overkill" SIP standards that discourage coal burning even where it does not violate healthrelated standards-by requiring that future extensions be granted only after the governor of
the state in which the source is located gives his consent. H.R. 10498, supra note 253, § 106.
260. H.R. REP. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The current text of the bills may
be found at 122 CONG. REC. 10180-217 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976).
261. Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 196, at 144, 158, 166, 177.
262. 120 CONG. REC. 10426 (daily ed. June 12, 1974).
263. Senate Clean Air Act Hearings, supra note 196, at 194.
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much as 20 percent to utility customers' bills. Illustrating EPA's
view of "reasonable" costs, Mr. Train also admitted that the average cost of installing a scrubber on a 1000 megawatt powerplant
would be approximately $100 million, while construction of an entire new plant of this size would cost only $300 million."'
In August 1975, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that scrubbers had not been demonstrated to be reliable or technologically feasible, that much of EPA's supporting data on scrubbers
was itself unreliable, and that EPA had acted arbitrarily and capriciously by ordering their purchase and installation on a new coalfired powerplant without taking into account the costs." 5 While
these issues remain unresolved and the EPA and industry are conducting further studies, it is widely believed in industry that the
"best available control technology" amendments being considered
by Congress will essentially force installation of costly scrubbers on
plants that choose to burn coal, whether or not their emissions meet
ambient air quality standards without scrubbers. 6
Uncertainties about future environmental restrictions on coal extraction also discourage investment in that industry. Although 30
states have passed legislation to control problems from deep and
surface mining, the lack of uniformity has led environmentalists,
industry and government to request a-workable national program." 7
On May 5, 1975, Congress passed the "Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1975," which would have established minimum
federal reclamation standards and a system of federal permits, and
would have levied a fee on each ton of coal mined for use in a
"reclamation fund" for orphan (abandoned) lands."6 On May 20,
1975, the President vetoed the bill, citing its adverse effects on jobs,
consumers' utility bills, coal production and the oil import situation." 9 At this writing, Congress is considering new surface mining
legislation.270
The potential for coal development under federal mineral leases
264. Id. at 299-300, 302.
265. Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1975). But see Union Electric
Co. v. EPA, 96 S. Ct. 2518 (1976) (economic or technological infeasibility may not be considered by EPA Administrator or federal courts on review of SIP); West Penn Power Co. v.
Train, 538 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1976).
266. Weekly Energy Report, Jan. 5, 1976, at 5.
267. FACS, supra note 14, at 11.
268. H.R. 25, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 7455 (daily ed. May 5, 1975).
269. 121 CONG. REC. 4405 (daily ed. May 20, 1975).
270. H.R. 9725, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Surface Mining and Control Act of 1975).
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also breeds uncertainty, for investors that anticipate the ready
availability of low-cost leases on coal-rich federal lands will withhold investment in new mines elsewhere. While the federal government owns approximately one-half of all coal lands in the contiguous United States and has statutory authority to lease vast rich
holdings to industry for development and production,"' a combination of environmental lawsuits and production problems under the
Interior Department's regulations has led to a moratorium on new
coal leasing and development of federal lands. The Ford Administration has actively attempted to resolve these problems and Congress is considering legislation to meet the goals of substantially
increased coal production that were enunciated by President
Ford."1
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, investment in coal production is inhibited by uncertainties about federal policies toward
competing fuel sources. During the last decade, the federal government has influenced the price of petroleum by granting percentage
depletion allowances and other tax incentives, and by subjecting oil
to quotas, tariffs, price controls and allocations. Even after the passage of EPCA, it is unclear what actions the government will take
that may affect the availability and price of petroleum. Similarly,
it is too early to predict the outcome of efforts to deregulate the price
of interstate natural gas, which many believe would result in increased gas prices, thus making coal a more attractive boiler fuel.
In addition, after two decades of favored federal treatment, nuclear
power is suffering from problems of regulatory lag, rising costs and
citizen protest, and it is questionable whether the nuclear industry
can expand to meet earlier optimistic projections for low cost electrical generation.
In this atmosphere of continuing uncertainty, it is unclear
whether and how the nation will make greater use of its most abundant fossil fuel resource. It is clear, however, that the leadtimes
needed to develop new surface mines and deep mines require that
investment decisions must be made now if the nation is to meet its
goal of large-scale coal substitution in the early 1980's.
271. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975) (originally enacted as
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437).
272. The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, S. 391, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
was passed by the Senate, 121 CONG. REC. 14573 (daily ed. July 31, 1975) and is being
considered by the House of Representatives.
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CONCLUSION

As shown above, efforts to substitute coal for petroleum and natural gas-so that the latter fuels may be redirected to higher, nonsteam boiler uses-face a formidable array of constraints. On the
one hand, technical problems involving long leadtimes and careful
logistical coordination must be tackled by producers and consumers, and investments must be made well in advance of the actual
extraction or use of coal. On the other hand, the wide variety of
regulations affecting coal use and production, and national policies
governing the price of competing fuels, are in a state of flux and the
resultant uncertainties deter decisions to invest in coal use or production.
While the recent Energy Policy and Conservation Act goes far
toward establishing a national oil policy, and other legislation grapples with long-range issues surrounding natural gas use, the nation
does not have an integrated, coherent coal policy that harmonizes
the congeries of laws governing the production and use of our most
abundant fossil-fuel resource. Piecemeal environmental regulation,
surface mining legislation and federal coal leasing policies all must
be dealt with and harmonized if we are to have large-scale coal
substitution by the 1980's.
S. 1777 is ambitious legislation. The extensive hearings and the
issues identified have provided the impetus for extensive analysis of
the potential for large-scale substitution of coal. However, the bill's
economic and regulatory provisions and the effects of large-scale
coal substitution on the environment may be more than the nation
is willing to pay to achieve greater energy independence. After analysis and debate, it may be concluded that the more limited ESECA
program, together with market forces, will bring coal use to a satisfactory level in the nation's energy budget.
It is clear, however, that since future coal substitution efforts will
entail long leadtimes, decisions must be made now if the nation is
to rely on increased coal use in the future. In determining the price
we are willing to pay, the issue is, as stated by Senator Randolph
at the beginning of this article, one of the extent and the strength
of the national commitment to increased coal use. The answers
given now by the Congress and Administration to the issues raised
by S. 1777 and other coal-related programs will do much to determine the use of the coal substitution option in the next decade. For
this reason, it is essential that we now develop a national policy for
coal equivalent in scope to that provided for oil by EPCA.

